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(2014).  
2. Id. at 213-14.
3. Richard Rogers, Daniel W. Shuman & Eric Y. Drogin, Miranda
Rights . . . and Wrongs: Myths, Methods, and Model Solutions, 23
CRIM. JUST. 4 (2008).
4. See generally ROGERS & DROGIN, supra note 1.
5. Richard Rogers, Getting It Wrong About Miranda Rights: False
Beliefs, Impaired Reasoning, and Professional Neglect, 66 AM.
PSYCHOL. 728 (2011). 
6. An example of severely impaired abilities is the failure to recall
even 50% of the Miranda warning immediately following its oral
or written administration.
7. Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confi-
dence Game, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259 (1996).
Judges are likely to respond with outright skepticism whenthe validity of a Miranda waiver is questioned because thedefendant claimed to be merely “depressed” or “anxious” at
the time of arrest. They may be reassured that extensive research
on Miranda abilities has largely borne out this perspective. 
Symptoms of depression and anxiety, by themselves, do not
increase the chances of impaired Miranda comprehension or
reasoning. For instance, defendants with even moderate to
severe depression have roughly the same odds of impaired
functioning as those with negligible depression. Only at the
extreme levels of depression does a pattern of deficits emerge
for Miranda comprehension but not for Miranda reasoning.1
Likewise, a similar pattern is observed even for certain psy-
chotic symptoms, such as delusions and paranoid distrust.2 On
reflection, both legal and mental-health professionals alike can
discern a plausible explanation for this occurring. Since most
delusions and persecutory thoughts do not involve the police
or the criminal-justice system, these symptoms are likely to
have only a peripheral influence on Miranda-relevant abilities.
Only when psychotic symptoms become truly pervasive (i.e.,
extremely severe) are they likely to impair Miranda compre-
hension and reasoning. 
This introduction underscores several related points. First,
judges would be correct in not equating even serious mental
disorders with invalid Miranda waivers. Second, Miranda
issues—as we consider the totality of the circumstances—must
be viewed as much more complex and nuanced than any sim-
ple association of symptoms with functional legal abilities.
Judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel alike may share
similar misconceptions regarding the general public’s knowledge
and understanding of Miranda. For instance, faulty perceptions
abound with respect to both the content and the meaning of
Miranda warnings. The next two sections address fundamental
misunderstandings as they apply to Miranda comprehension
and reasoning. We begin with comprehension, focusing first on
fundamental myths about Miranda advisements.
THREE FUNDAMENTAL MYTHS ABOUT MIRANDA
WARNINGS
Rogers, Shuman, and Drogin3 first articulated major funda-
mental myths that threaten the integrity of Miranda warnings
and subsequent waivers. For instance, judges are sometimes
led to assume that there exists only one, simply written
Miranda warning that is applied uniformly across the United
States. This uniformity myth is shattered by research data that
have identified more than 1,000 unique variations, varying in
length by more than 500 words, with reading levels that range
from grade three to post-college.4
In 2011, Rogers5 proposed the “general neglect hypothesis”
in an effort to explain why Miranda issues were routinely over-
looked by the criminal courts—and in particular by the
defense bar. Based on very conservative estimates, thousands
of arrestees with severely impaired Miranda abilities6 are over-
looked or disregarded by defense attorneys each year. This sec-
tion examines three fundamental Miranda myths that are
strongly linked to the general neglect hypothesis. For example,
legal professionals are likely to overlook Miranda issues if they
believe they are irrelevant (i.e., “just a formality” because
everyone already knows them).
1. JUST A FORMALITY
One general misassumption is rooted in the notion that
nearly all Americans have a working knowledge of the Miranda
warnings. If this were true, then the communication of
Miranda rights would aptly be captured by the phrase, “just a
formality.” Although Leo7 was critical of police practices in
downplaying the importance of Miranda warnings in what he
has characterized as a “confidence game,” arresting officers
may genuinely see these advisements as nothing more than a
necessary bureaucratic exercise—mandated by the Supreme
Court—for defendants who are already fully apprised of their
rights. Simply put, if suspects already know their Miranda
rights, then anything more than the most cursory advisement
represents not only an unnecessary effort but also a potentially
damaging distraction at a critical moment in the investigation.
Judges will recognize instantly why the commonsensical
premise for knowing Miranda warnings seems incontestable:
Residents of the United States are constantly bombarded with
snatches of stereotyped Miranda recitations via countless police
dramas and various outlets of the public media. The litany
almost inevitably begins with “you have the right to remain
silent.” Based on this compelling yet false premise, many attor-
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neys from both the prosecution and defense unhesitatingly
assume that criminal defendants are fully cognizant of their
Miranda rights as expressed in Miranda warnings. This basic
myth, “everyone knows their Miranda warnings,”8 appears to be
strikingly pervasive across our communities. However, this view
is simply unwarranted. When a cross-section of the community
(e.g., juror pools) was surveyed anonymously,9 roughly one-
third (35%) conceded they had little or no Miranda knowledge.
Indeed, they were largely accurate in estimating their ignorance
of Miranda warnings. While performing moderately well on the
first component, right to silence, they faltered on the other three
basic components, averaging only 45% correct: risks of talking,
right to counsel, and free legal services. The fifth component of
most Miranda warnings,10 addressing the assertion of rights at
any time, or continuing rights, is almost universally missed.
Intuitively, it might be argued that investigating officers
could easily screen which arrestees were knowledgeable about
Miranda—simply by asking them. In this regard, more than
80% of Miranda advisements11 directly ask arrestees to affirm
their understanding of the Miranda warning. Most defendants
provide assents, however, through unelaborated responses
(e.g., “yes”). Shouldn’t the criminal courts view such terse yet
ubiquitous assents with slack-jawed skepticism?
Self-appraisals. High confidence does not necessarily trans-
late into high accuracy.12 For instance, about 30% of those pro-
fessing a high level of Miranda knowledge lacked any substan-
tive memory concerning the Miranda component of free legal
services.13
Adversarial context. Many arrestees justifiably view their
investigating officers as adversaries, who are responsible for
their arrests and current detentions.14 In this context, it is
entirely understandable why some detainees would be reluc-
tant to acknowledge any serious limitations, such as a limited
cognitive ability to understand Miranda, which might further
weaken—at least in their eyes—their adversarial position. 
Irrelevance. Many arrestees may perceive Miranda warnings
as inconsequential formalities and pay very little attention to
their content. Investigating officers may also communicate this
message—either directly or indirectly. As an example of the
latter, advisements may be delivered in a “mechanical, bureau-
cratic manner so as to trivialize their potential significance and
minimize their effectiveness.”15 Alternatively, warnings may be
presented with rapid-fire delivery, precluding any meaningful
comprehension. Canadian research on audio-recorded warn-
ings administered to actual arrestees has clocked average
speeds exceeding 200 words per minute.16 Besides the virtual
incomprehensibility of such breakneck speeds, the warnings
were frequently marred by omissions and inaccuracies.  
Acquiescence. The response style of “acquiescence” refers to
an almost reflexive agreement (i.e., yea-saying) that is especially
prominent when certain vulnerable defendants are confronted
by authority figures. For persons with intellectual disabilities,
yes-no-type questions—pervasive in Miranda waivers—are par-
ticularly vulnerable to acquiescence. This pattern of acquies-
cent responding is captured in the title of a classic study: When
in Doubt, Say Yes.17 However, this problem can easily be averted
by asking open-ended questions,18 such as “What do you
remember about your Miranda rights?” As a note of caution, the
courts should be skeptical if acquiescence is raised for adult
arrestees without major intellectual deficits.19 While genuine
cases of acquiescence can occur, they tend to be relatively infre-
quent for those with adequate cognitive abilities who lack other
relevant conditions, such as a dependent-personality disorder.
2. CONVEYING KNOWLEDGE VIA WARNINGS
The Supreme Court of the United States consistently
exhibits an unshakeable belief that Miranda warnings repre-
sent a highly effective method of conveying information. In
Berghuis v. Thompkins,20 for example, it was unquestioningly
assumed that the defendant was fully aware of his rights once
properly advised before questioning. Even after nearly three
hours, the Court concluded: “As questioning commences and
then continues, the suspect has the opportunity to consider
the choices he or she faces and to make a more informed deci-
sion, either to insist on silence or to cooperate.” In other
words, the Court appears to presume that all properly cau-
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tioned defendants remain fully apprised of their Miranda rights
and can even accumulate additional information via the ques-
tioning to further inform their decision making.
As noted by Blackwood and her colleagues,21 the Court
appears to have fallen victim to the long-disproved supposition
that the mind operates like an audio recorder that accurately
records and correctly accesses relevant information.22 The
“recorder fallacy” of memory has been described as “one of the
five great myths of popular psychology.”23 As observed by
Rogers and Drogin,24 however, the Court was not provided
with “any information to the contrary” (i.e., evidence of
impaired Miranda comprehension, either immediately after the
warning or following the several-hour delay). Given the pre-
sumption of competency, the Court was left with no choice but
to assume that the defendant was fully functioning at the time
of his incriminating statement.
A mere notification of rights cannot be equated with the edu-
cation of one’s rights. Simply because something is stated or
written does not mean that it was adequately heard or read.
Even if it were heard or read, that does not necessarily mean
that it was adequately comprehended. Obviously, judges can-
not be expected to take into account every instance of willful
inattention in determining the validity of Miranda waivers.
Nonetheless, Miranda warnings can include easily identifiable
elements that essentially preclude the real comprehension of
Miranda material. Such a direct statement likely provokes
healthy skepticism. Consider for the moment reading-compre-
hension levels. It makes no sense—legal or otherwise—to
expect a typical arrestee with a sixth- or seventh-grade reading
level to comprehend a Miranda advisement written at a col-
lege-graduate reading level. Furthermore, research has con-
vincingly demonstrated that lengthy oral warnings cannot be
comprehended.25 When given relatively short passages (less
than 90 words), well-educated adults are considered to have
superior memories if they can immediately recall as much as
72% of the material.26 With typical Miranda warnings—rang-
ing from 125 to 175 words—oral comprehension typically fails
to reach 50%, even when administered to college undergradu-
ates.27 At an even more basic level of analysis, research on hun-
dreds of pretrial defendants28 has clearly identified problematic
words that foil comprehension. Beyond difficult vocabulary
(e.g., “indigent”), other words are legalistic (e.g., “admissible”)
or have more commonly used definitions (e.g., “execute” as
meaning “to kill”). These issues are addressed more fully in the
section “Blueprint for Improving Miranda Warnings.”
3. OVERCOMING MIRANDA MISCONCEPTIONS
A third and final fundamental misconception is that
Miranda warnings go beyond conveying knowledge to help in
rectifying Miranda misconceptions. As a concrete example, not
just judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, but rather nearly
everyone—arrestees, undergraduates, and members of the
community—can dutifully recite “you have the right to remain
silent.” Nevertheless, a substantial minority continue to
embrace the opposite belief. For instance, 20% of prospective
jurors,29 26% of undergraduates, and 31% of defendants30
wrongly believe that silence will be used as incriminating evi-
dence. This crucial fallacy can play a determinative role in the
waiving of rights.  
Rogers and Drogin31 identified approximately 20 misas-
sumptions that could have direct bearing on Miranda-waiver
decisions. For example, arrestees in about one-fourth of Amer-
ican jurisdictions are advised that they have the right to silence
until they have legal counsel.32 Assuming arrestees believe
what they are told, then the frame of reference changes from if
they should waive to when they should waive their rights and
talk. Given that offenders are susceptible to forfeiting long-
term considerations for immediate gains33 (e.g., “getting it
over”), they may decide to talk now without the benefit of
counsel. As a second example, many defendants believe their
statements to the police cannot be used as evidence without a
signed Miranda waiver. As a consequence of this gross misbe-
lief,34 arrestees may not recognize how almost any form of
admission can jeopardize their defenses. 
Miranda warnings constitute an ineffective method for recti-
fying fundamental Miranda misconceptions. This finding is
hardly surprising, inasmuch as the Supreme Court justices in
Miranda and subsequent cases could hardly have envisioned the
rampant nature of Miranda misconceptions that would emerge
in subsequent decades. Even if they did, the possible solutions
might further confound rather than enlighten detainees. 
Take, for example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
State v. Benoit35 that sought to remedy juvenile suspects’ core
misconceptions. Its model Miranda warning reassured juveniles
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that invoking their rights carried no penalty: “You will not be
punished for deciding to use these rights.”36 In their well-mean-
ing and concerted attempt to correct fundamental Miranda mis-
conceptions, the justices unwittingly created an exhaustive
Miranda advisement that is likely to overwhelm even the most
educated adult by its extraordinary length: 425 words for the
“misdemeanor” version and ballooning to 498 words for the
“felony” version. Juvenile suspects are then presented sequen-
tially with two forms of Miranda waivers totaling an additional
175 words for a grand total of 600 or more words. A common-
sensical question that begs for a response: “At what point do
juveniles simply stop listening or reading?”37
For the purposes of this article, we performed an additional
analysis on whether “frequent flyers” in the criminal-justice
system at either the “gold” (20-39 arrests) or “platinum” (40+
arrests) levels realized any substantive reductions in their
Miranda misconceptions when compared to defendants with
fewer than five arrests.38 Contrary to expectations, we found
virtually no improvements in average misconceptions: 7.6 for
inexperienced defendants versus 7.5 for gold-level and 7.0 for
platinum-level defendants. These data expose a fundamental
fallacy that repeated exposures to Miranda warnings serve an
educative function.39
Rogers and his colleagues40 directly tested whether repeated
exposure to Miranda advisements had any curative effect on
Miranda misconceptions. To provide greater opportunities for
learning, they exposed defendants to five differently worded
Miranda warnings, which were interspersed with other tasks to
avoid fatigue. To keep these participants actively involved, they
were tested on their immediate recall after each warning. Despite
this intense exposure, no overall reduction in Miranda miscon-
ceptions was observed, irrespective of whether the warnings
were provided orally or in writing. As the only bright note, a
small number of defendants with substantial difficulties showed
modest improvement, but they were clearly outnumbered by
those with no improvement or even worse performance.41
MIRANDA-WAIVER DECISIONS
Beyond police coercion impairing their voluntariness,42
Miranda waivers typically rely on knowing and intelligent
decisions to relinquish Miranda rights. As two distinct yet
related components,43 the “knowing” prong provides the nec-
essary foundation for an “intelligent” waiver. As an analogy
from chess, Rogers and Drogin observed that simply knowing
how the pieces move is, by itself, insufficient for rational deci-
sion making.44
Grisso45 described five important components of rational
decision making as it applies to legal competence.46 The five
levels are outlined below with illustrative questions that judges
will presumably want defense counsel to have asked to inves-
tigate the level of rational decision making: 
1. Awareness of the alternatives. Counsel may wish to inquire:
“What did you see as your choices after you were given the
Miranda warning?”
2. Potential consequences of each alternative. For each choice,
counsel may wish to simply inquire: “What did you think
would happen?”
3. Likelihood of these consequences. As a follow-up to #2, coun-
sel may wish to ask the following for each alternative: “How
certain were you that this would happen?”
4. Weighing the desirability of each consequence. As a follow-up
to #2, counsel may wish to query for each alternative: “How
much did you want this to happen?”
5. Comparative deliberation of alternatives and consequences. As
the final question, counsel may wish to ask: “How did you
make the decision?”
Judges are likely to be taken aback by the low level of ratio-
nal thinking exhibited by many defendants when faced with
these potentially life-altering decisions. Considering this
notion within a legal framework, the Supreme Court of the
United States held in Iowa v. Tovar47 that a waiver is intelligent
“when the defendant knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open.” A rhetorical but very real question is,
“How open?” To be fully open, levels #2, #3, and #4 must be
considered. To avoid being fully closed, #2 seems essential. For
the remaining levels, the necessary appreciation may have less
to do with accuracy than the underlying reasons for this belief.
Using #3 as an illustration, a female mentally disordered sus-
pect may correctly believe that her confession may result in an
“earthly” conviction but reason delusionally that she is exempt
from “earthly” powers.
Miranda reasoning should not be viewed as an all-or-nothing
process. Indeed, Blackwood and her colleagues48 found that the
large majority of defendants with markedly impaired reasoning
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id. Both modalities should be used: “The following is to be read and
explained by the officer, and the child shall read it before signing.”
38. Averages are derived from the database supporting RICHARD ROGERS,
KENNETH W. SEWELL, ERIC Y. DROGIN & CHELSEA E. FIDUCCIA, STAN-
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MANUAL (2012).
39. See State v. Lanning, 5 Wash. App. 426, 487 P.2d 785 (1971), and
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
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Miranda Misconceptions? 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 397 (2013).
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mance.
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43. Interestingly, in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the
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intelligent prong in holding that a basic awareness was sufficient
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on some aspect of the Miranda waiver could still rationally con-
sider some short- and long-term consequences regarding other
aspects. For instance, they found most irrational thinking
involved the benefits of exercising rather than waiving Miranda
rights. For this article, we performed an additional analysis on
our extensive database of more than 600 pretrial defendants.49
As summarized in Table 1, relatively few defendants evidenced
substantially impaired reasoning for waiving or exercising
rights. The notable exception (14.4%) involved grossly misper-
ceived risks of requesting counsel. Examples include funda-
mental fallacies about affordability (e.g., no attorney without
the capacity to pay) or allegiance (e.g., court-appointed attor-
ney will divulge your admissions to the judge). Counsel may
wish to inquire, for example, “Why didn’t you ask for an attor-
ney immediately after being detained?  Why didn’t you ask for
an attorney immediately after hearing your Miranda warnings?”
Such questions may help to illuminate the defendant’s thinking
before the Miranda waiver.  
The picture becomes much more complex when irrational
and questionable reasoning are considered together. As a
benchmark, roughly 20% meet this combined category. When
this combined category is examined for defendants who have
been found incompetent to stand trial, the number nearly dou-
bles.50 Depending on other evidence, counsel may wish to rou-
tinely consider Miranda issues when competency to stand trial
is raised. In general, a major challenge facing defense counsel
and their retained experts is that many defendants are con-
fused about their memories around the time of the arrest due
to intoxication and severe situational stressors.
Issues of impaired Miranda reasoning are almost invariably
raised by defense counsel. Nonetheless, prosecutors as well as
judges have a strongly vested interest that only genuine cases
go forward. In addition to research on possibly feigned
Miranda vocabulary,51 Rogers and his colleagues are beginning
to examine whether defendants are evidencing a believable
pattern of Miranda misconceptions.52 These approaches can be
used to evaluate whether some defendants are falsely claiming
gross misconceptions in an intentional effort to suppress a
completely valid Miranda waiver. For example, a “Discrimina-
tion Index” was established based on which misconceptions
show remarkable deficits or moderate improvements when
defendants try to feign impaired Miranda reasoning.
A BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING MIRANDA WARNINGS
Citing earlier Miranda research,53 the American Bar Associ-
ation issued a policy statement to legislative bodies and gov-
ernmental agencies, asking for their constructive efforts
toward “the development of simplified Miranda warning lan-
guage for use with juvenile arrestees.”54 In our estimation, the
need for comprehensible warnings should have no age barri-
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TABLE 1: DEFENDANTS’ ABILITIES TO REASON ABOUT WAIVING AND EXERCISING THEIR MIRANDA RIGHTS
Percentages for Different Levels of Reasoning
WEIGHING OPTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED REASONING
QUESTIONABLE
REASONING
RATIONAL: 
SHORT-TERMa
RATIONAL:
LONG-TERMb
Benefit of waiving
Silence 2.6 20.2 20.2 51.5
Counsel 4.7 13.1 13.1 55.8
Risk of waiving
Silence 5.1 14.3 14.3 47.1
Counsel 3.2 20.2 20.2 43.4
Benefit of exercising
Silence 2.9 20.2 20.2 46.6
Counsel 0.8 11.0 11.0 35.4
Risk of exercising
Silence 5.5 14.6 14.6 30.0
Counsel 14.6 10.6 10.6 47.4
a Considers immediate circumstances only. 
b Considers future consequences.
55. See Rogers, supra note 11, at 782.
56. See ROGERS & DROGIN, supra note 1.
57. Depending on the jurisdiction, judges may wish to avoid poten-
tially polarizing issues between defense and prosecution.  
ers. In 2008, Rogers55 called for the elimination of incompre-
hensible warnings, particularly those which he categorized as
the “worst offenders.” In their recent book, Mirandized State-
ments,56 Rogers and Drogin present tools on selecting simple
language for building effective Miranda warnings that can be
used with both juvenile and adult arrestees. They recommend
grassroot efforts to promote procedural justice involving the
key stakeholders, such as law enforcement, prosecutors,
defense attorneys—and, of course, judges.
Judges play a highly influential role in the American crimi-
nal-justice system. While they may not wish to become deeply
involved in the development of model Miranda warnings,57
they can still help to shape and improve current practices.
Toward this end, we offer a simplified blueprint that should
enable judges and their staff to facilitate simple yet effective
changes in the existing Miranda advisements.
Table 2 outlines the simple steps toward improving Miranda
warnings. For vocabulary, five simple steps could effectively
TABLE 2: BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING MIRANDA WARNINGS
STEPS ISSUES DETAILS/EXAMPLES
REMOVE DIFFICULT VOCABULARYa
1 Remove legalese
Examples: admissible, alleged, appearance, deposes, detain,
duress, entitled, executed, inadmissible, incriminate, know-
ingly, privilege, retain, revocation, statutory, stipulate, waive,
waiver
2 Remove formalized words Examples: aforementioned, hereinafter, hereby, pursuant,
whatsoever, whomsoever
3 Avoid homonyms (particularly
problematic for oral advisements)
Examples: admission, aggravated, charge, commitment, coun-
sel, execute, immunity, petition, terminate, waive
4 Avoid difficult words (10+ grade
reading level)
Examples: appointed, certify, coerce, coercion, compelled,
compulsion, counsel, discretionary, indigent, incompetent,
intimidation, invoke, leniency, pending, perjury, proceedings,
render, renounce, signify
5 Avoid infrequent words (less than
one word per million in writing)
Examples: certify, cross-examine, detain, discontinue, induce-
ment, initialed, interrogation
SHORTEN MIRANDA WARNINGSb
1 Component: Silence Less than 14 words
2 Component: Evidence against you Less than 16 words
3 Component: Attorney Less than 20 words
4 Component: Free legal services Less than 25 words
5 Component: Continuing rights Less than 23 words
6 Total warning Less than 56 wordsc
DECREASE READING-COMPREHENSION DEMANDSd
1 Component: Silence Flesch-Kincaid less than 4.2 grade level
2 Component: Evidence against you Flesch-Kincaid less than 6.9 grade level
3 Component: Attorney Flesch-Kincaid less than 4.5 grade level
4 Component: Free legal services Flesch-Kincaid less than 7.3 grade level
5 Component: Continuing rights Flesch-Kincaid less than 6.4 grade level
6 Total warning Flesch-Kincaid less than 6.4 grade level
a. Some words qualify for multiple categories. For simplicity, they are listed under the first applicable category. Vocabulary issues were distilled from Appen-
dixes A and B of ROGERS & DROGIN, supra note 1.
b. With warnings from 945 jurisdictions, these lengths represent the first quartile, with more than 200 variations found in general warnings. 
c. This number is based on the total words and does not equal the sum of each component.
d. With warnings from 945 jurisdictions, these reading grade levels represent the first quartile, with more than 200 variations found in general warnings.
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remove abstruse words that often confuse even the educated
public. 
Remove legalese: Simple words can easily be substituted for
words with specialized legal meanings, such as “admissible,”
“appearance,” “inadmissible,” “stipulate,” and “waiver.”
Remove formalized words: Some centuries-old formal words
are no longer used in common discourse. Examples include
“aforementioned” and “whomsoever.”
Remove homonyms: These words are particularly confusing
with oral Miranda warnings. Most defendants have heard “exe-
cute” and “terminate,” but many ascribe a very different mean-
ing to them than what is needed to accurately convey the
legally relevant information.
Remove difficult words. Some words clearly require close to a
high-school education or more before adults can even recog-
nize their correct meanings. Examples particularly relevant to
Miranda warnings include “indigent” and “proceedings.”
Remove infrequent words. Some words very rarely appear in
print; even if known, they can be barriers to a full understand-
ing of the sentence. Examples are “certify” and “interrogation.”
The second two components can be achieved easily, using
Microsoft Word or other major word-processing programs.
Word provides readability statistics—including word counts
and reading grade levels—almost instantly. The Flesch-Kincaid
reading-level estimate that the program generates is widely
accepted and used by many governmental agencies, including
the Department of Defense.58 As an important caution, its read-
ing levels are set for at least 75% comprehension;59 often sev-
eral more grades of reading ability are needed to ensure com-
plete comprehension.
The take-home message is very simple. With less than an
hour of unhurried work, the language of Miranda warnings
could be easily simplified. Equally simple would be the short-
ening of the Miranda warning and the marked reducing of its
reading demands to grade six or even lower. Remember, the
reading levels reported in Table 2 were found with several hun-
dred variations (i.e., the lowest quartile). With a more con-
certed effort, even lower grade levels are easily achievable. 
The blueprint for improving Miranda warnings could be
extended beyond local jurisdictions and considered at the
national level starting with Table 2 and supplemented by the
extensive guidelines60 in Rogers and Drogin. Building on the
ABA policy, the American Judges Association (AJA) could
adopt a more encompassing national policy with the attainable
goal of eliminating most incomprehensible warnings, irrespec-
tive of age or language.61 This policy would be consistent with
Miranda’s language calling for “clear and unequivocal” com-
munication of constitutional rights.62 Moreover, this policy
embraces the AJA’s overriding objective63 of being “dedicated
to improving the systems of justice in North America.” Sub-
stantiated with an AJA White Paper,64 a movement toward
national reform of Miranda warnings could be galvanized.
Richard Rogers, Ph.D., ABPP, is Regents Profes-
sor of Psychology at the University of North
Texas. For the last decade, he has been a prin-
cipal investigator on grants from the National
Science Foundation, systematically researching
Miranda warnings and waivers with more than
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empirical investigations. His 2014 ABA book
with Eric Drogin is entitled Mirandized Statements: Successfully
Navigating the Legal and Psychological Issues. Citing his
research on Miranda, Dr. Rogers was nationally recognized by the
American Psychological Association for his distinguished contri-
butions to both professional practice (2008) and public policy
(2011). Dr. Rogers also serves as an expert consultant of forensic
issues, including Miranda waivers.
Eric Y. Drogin, J.D., Ph.D., ABPP, is an attorney
and board-certified forensic psychologist serv-
ing on faculty of the Harvard Medical School
Department of Psychiatry (as a member of the
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center’s Foren-
sic Psychiatry Service and in the Program in
Psychiatry & the Law). He currently chairs the
American Bar Association’s Behavioral & Neu-
roscience Law Committee. Dr. Drogin’s other professional roles
have included President of the American Board of Forensic Psy-
chology, President of the New Hampshire Psychological Associa-
tion, Chair of the American Psychological Association’s Commit-
tee on Legal Issues, Chair of the American Psychological Associa-
tion’s Committee on Professional Practice & Standards, and Com-
missioner of the American Bar Association’s Commission on Men-
tal & Physical Disability Law.
58. John A. Schinka & Randy Borum, Readability of Adult Psy-
chopathology Inventories, 5 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 384 (1993).  
59. WILLIAM H. DUBAY, THE PRINCIPLES OF READABILITY (2004).
60. See ROGERS & DROGIN, supra note 1, at 21-45 (“An Ounce of Pre-
vention”).
61. Spanish Miranda warnings sometimes include mistranslations and
awkward usages. See Richard Rogers, Amor A. Correa, Lisa L.
Hazelwood, Daniel W. Shuman, Raquel C. Hoersting & Hayley L.
Blackwood, Spanish Translations of Miranda Warnings and Totality
of the Circumstances, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 61 (2009).
62. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). 
63. This quote is from the current AJA president, Judge Brian
MacKenzie, in the “President’s Message” on the home page of the
American Judges Association, http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/index.html. 
64. An excellent example is PAMELA CASEY, KEVIN BURKE & STEVE
LEBEN, MINDING THE COURT: ENHANCING THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS (2012), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/pdfs/Minding-the-
Court.pdf. As a possible parallel to informed-waiver decisions, it
provides examples of how benchcards and other decisional tools
can facilitate judicial decision making.
156 Court Review - Volume 51 
